What Happens When Social Pressures Collide? The Role of Environmental Pressures Throughout Life by Lyons, Jeffrey
Boise State University
ScholarWorks
Political Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations Department of Political Science
4-1-2017
What Happens When Social Pressures Collide?
The Role of Environmental Pressures Throughout
Life
Jeffrey Lyons
Boise State University
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:
Lyons, Jeffrey. (2017). The Family and Partisan Socialization in Red and Blue America. Political Psychology, 38(2), 297-312.
which has been published in final form at doi: 10.1111/pops.12336. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley
Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
What Happens When Social Pressures Collide?  The Role of 
Environmental Pressures Throughout Life 
 
Jeffrey Lyons 
Department of Political Science 
Boise State University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How do competing social influences shape individual partisanship over the course of 
the life cycle?  People enter and exit a host of environments over the course of the 
lifespan, and these environments provide social pressures that can conflict or reinforce 
early socialized attitudes.  Socialization could be an agent for either opinion change, or 
opinion stability.  Using the Youth-Parent Socialization Study and constructing partisan 
environmental measures at the county-level, I explore this question.  The findings 
demonstrate that environments exert significant socializing influence over the lifespan, 
moderating the persistence of early forces.  This helps to reconcile two competing 
perspectives on the enduring nature of familial socialization.  When environments 
throughout life provide reinforcing social pressures, parental influence persists over 
time.  However, when early socialized influence is challenged over time by the political 
environment that citizens reside in, the influence of early parental socialization is offset 
and nullified. 
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Political socialization comes in many forms, and from numerous sources.  These processes are undoubtedly 
consequential for the political attitudes and behaviors of the American citizen.  But what happens when social 
influence is delivered to the individual from different sources, and what happens when these different 
socialization pressures collide?  How does the individual who is predisposed to be a Democrat because of 
early familial socialization respond to a change in environments later in life to a context which provides 
Republican leaning social pressures?  Our understanding of the formative power of early processes suggests 
a relatively static individual, for whom socialization was consequential, but primarily early in life (Campbell 
et al. 1960; Sears and Funk 1999) and later changes in influence are not likely to be material – often called 
the “persistence hypothesis” (Sears 1989; Miller and Sears 1986). 
 
However, it is also suggested that social pressures extend beyond early years and originate from one’s 
surroundings (Newcomb et al. 1967; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), raising the possibility that individuals are 
reasonably dynamic through their lives and political attitudes and behaviors respond to the changes in 
influences or environments that occur (Miller and Sears 1986).  These two different sets of socializing 
pressures can be in congruence or conflict.  If later environments and the social pressures they supply conflict 
with early influences, it may be the case that they can undo the early familial socialization process which has 
garnered the preponderance of attention in the formation of partisanship (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell 
et al. 1960; Tedin 1974; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007).  When social forces conflict, which 
influences maintain and which are mitigated? 
 
The implications are not only a more complete understanding of social influence, but also different 
suggestions about the socialized citizen.  A problem with the socialized perspective of partisanship is that it 
struggles to explain the changes we observe in party identification over time (though see Zuckerman, 
Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Dinas 2013).  The persistence model implies a great deal of stability in 
partisanship as socialized influences are fixed over time once the citizen has left the household because of 
enduring early influences.  The findings presented here help to reconcile this issue, maintaining a view of  
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partisanship as being largely socialized, but recognizing that competing social forces over time that can either 
reinforce early influences fostering persistence, or challenging them and freeing the individual from his or 
her partisan roots. 
 
Further, this speaks to a theoretical discussion amongst scholars of social influence about what types of 
relationships foster social influence.  Much of the literature on early socialization comes from a social 
cohesion perspective where strong, intimate ties – such as those with parents – generate the most influence.  
Others argue for structural equivalence – the idea that influence comes from those with similar social and 
structural positions, regardless of the intimacy of the ties.  Looking at how familial influences from early in 
life (social cohesion) endure in the face of less intimate influence but from contextually supplied peers 
(structural equivalence) joins in this conversation by demonstrating the degree to which social influence 
originating from the social cohesion perspective holds up in the face of pressures from sources that are 
structurally equivalent.  Exploring this tension that can arise from conflict between the two kinds of social 
influence is instructive for developing a more complete understanding of the interplay that occurs between 
different types of influence. 
 
I use the Youth-Parent Socialization Study, which follows a sample of Americans over 4 survey waves from 
1965-1997.  This survey is uniquely suited to addressing the questions presented here because it contains 
measures of early parental social influence, as well as observations of the same individuals over a 32 year 
time period.  The findings paint a picture of social influence that is extended over the life cycle where the 
agents of socialization shift from the parents to broader environments once people leave the home.  Over the 
course of the panel, micro and macro-environmental socialization accounts for as much variation in 
individual partisanship as do the pre-adult social forces that garner the bulk of attention in the socialization 
literature. 
 
Perhaps most notably, this creates an exchange between persisting parental socialization, and 
contemporaneous environmental social pressure.  When these influences align and environments reinforce 
early processes, the effects of parental socialization persist over the life-cycle, conforming with our 
understanding of the enduring legacy of these effects.  However, when environments challenge the influences 
learned in adolescence, they appear to terminate parental socializing effects, presumably initiating a 
detachment from predispositions and opening the door to partisan change – consistent with the “revisionist 
hypothesis” which questions the degree to which early processes crystallize party identification (Sears 1989). 
 
Socialized Partisanship: The Family and Surrounding Environment 
 
The notion that partisanship is formed through social processes is well established.  The preponderance of 
evidence pointing to these social roots focuses on the pre-adult years as being both formative and lasting over 
time.  The family appears to be the most influential agent of pre-adult socialization for forming party 
affiliations (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell et al. 1960; Tedin 1974; Hyman 1959; Jennings and Langton 
1969; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978; Kroh and Selb 2009; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; 
Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007), though less instrumental for other political attitudes and issue 
opinions (Tedin 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Connell 1972; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978; though 
see Dalton 1980; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009 for exceptions).  The family is so formative in large 
part due to the amount of time children spend with their parents, the lack of strong prior political orientations 
in pre-adulthood, the intimate nature of the relationships, as well as their receptivity to the messages they are 
provided with from family sources (Sears and Levy 2003). 
 
While family appears to exert the strongest pull on partisanship, pre-adult socialization does not end outside 
of the home.  Peer and friend networks serve to shape political orientations (Beck 1977; Campbell 1980; 
Settle, Bond, and Levitt 2011), as do the schools that provide young people with many of their social contacts 
(Levin 1961; Langton 1967; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Campbell 2006).  However, these micro-
environments in the form of the home, friendship networks, and schools are both a product of, and constrained 
by the macro-environments they are embedded within such as the neighborhood, community, county, and 
state.  These macro-environments also provide independent socializing influences in childhood and 
adolescence that mold individual political persuasions (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; Campbell 2006; 
Pacheco 2008; Wolak 2009; Gimpel and Lay 2005). 
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The implication being that social pressures matter significantly early in life when the citizen’s beliefs are 
relatively unformed and yielding, but that once early adulthood has been reached the individual’s partisanship 
has fully formed and there is little room left for social influence.  Erikson and Tedin (2011) echo this view, 
“Regarding persistence, two major points merit elaboration.  First, political attitudes are malleable through 
the impressionable years.  Second, after the impressionable years, political orientations harden considerably” 
(155).  Yet, we know that the influence of early socialization, notably the transmission of partisanship from 
parents to children diminishes with time over the life cycle (Niemi and Jennings 1991; Searing, Wright, and 
Rabinowitz 1976; Achen 2002). 
 
To the extent that we have explored socialization later in life, spouses have garnered much of the attention.  
Spouses tend to represent some of the most prominent discussion partners that individuals have (Beck 2001).  
The close ties between spouses, and constant interaction set the stage for substantial amounts of influence to 
be conferred.  From a social cohesion perspective, this generates frequent exchanges of information with a 
trusted source, and as such, spouse’s ability to impart socially supplied information and influence is 
potentially unparalleled (Kenny 1994). 
 
We observe spouse’s influencing each other’s attitudes across a host of non-political domains such as career 
(Smith and Moen 1998), health (Homish and Leonard 2005, 2008), and consumer (Wilkes 1975) decisions.  
These influences extent to more politically related stances such as individual’s vote choice (Kenny 1998), 
and partisanship (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007).  In Germany and Great Britain, and the 
congruence between spousal partisan attitudes appears to increase over the duration of the marriage 
(Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007), and we observe spouses influencing each other’s attitudes in 
Australia as well (Hayes and Bean 1994).  While questions of spousal influence versus selection persist (e.g. 
Alford et al. 2011), some have noted that the congruence of spousal attitudes over time is more suggestive of 
influence (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Jennings and Stoker 2001). 
 
If partisanship is not entirely stable over time and the effects of early socialization diminish through the years, 
what influences step in to fill the void left by the lasting parental social imprint?  We believe that spousal 
affiliations in-part fill this void, but for many, spouses are also held (relatively) constant over time.  The one 
kind of social pressure that often does vary considerably over time is that which originates from the places 
where we live and the broader distributions of beliefs and opinions that we are surrounded by. 
 
Environmental Socialization Over the Life Cycle 
 
Neighborhoods, communities, and broader environments provide the individual with many of the same social 
pressures that were received from parents in pre-adulthood (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).  While these 
pressures may be more mixed in nature and less pervasive than pressures from the family home, they provide 
many of the same influences.  In fact, surrounding contexts appear to influence partisanship for children and 
adolescents independent of parental effects.  Community heterogeneity (Campbell 2006) and 
partisan/demographic characteristics (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003), state campaign environments 
(Wolak 2009), and politically competitive contexts (Pacheco 2008) all socialize youths to a host of political 
attitudes and behaviors.  Collectively, the argument is that these extra-parental environments supply children 
and adolescents with information which shapes opinions, stimuli that foster engagement in politics, and 
norms of which views and behaviors are acceptable and which are not.  Why should these pressures cease 
when the individual matures and leaves the home? 
 
Citizens receive information from co-workers, pressures to conform from peers and neighbors, observe 
partisan in-group and out-groups via bumper stickers and yard signs, and encounter the distribution of 
opinions in their environment at barbeques and the water cooler at work.  Whether through the provision of 
partisan information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), a sense of norm adoption (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988), 
or simply not wanting to be the outcast, these daily social interactions that people have with those around 
them operate much the same as the influences from the family that were encountered earlier in life.  Further, 
the social contacts that surround citizens on a daily basis are likely to occupy similar social and structural 
positions.  People live in neighborhoods and work in professions predominately with those of similar  
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socioeconomic characteristics.  These structural similarities can be powerful conduits of social influence as 
individuals absorb norms and expectations of those who are like them (Burt 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1995). 
 
What these later environments may lack the consistency and pervasiveness of messages that youths are 
exposed to, they make up for in duration.  By most accounts, parents have roughly 6-8 years in which to 
socialize the partisanship of their children (Hess and Torney 1967).  For reasons pointed out earlier these 6-
8 years are extremely formative, but consider the individual who leaves home, relocates for a job and spends 
a 30 year career in a different environment.  The lasting imprint of the early years should begin to wane over 
time (Jennings and Niemi 1991), and the adult environment should begin exerting socializing influences of 
its own.   The expectation that follows is that environmental socialization is a lifelong process.  Early in life 
the environment that matters most is the family and the household, but once people enter adulthood and leave 
the home, the agent of socialization expands to the surrounding macro-environment consisting of towns, 
communities, and cities.  These environments and the distributions of opinions within them fill the void left 
by ebbing parental influence and become a more formative socializing agent for the remainder of the life 
cycle. 
 
H1:  Political environments will exert formative socializing influences once the individual 
leaves the home and will endure over the course of the life cycle. 
 
Environments can serve to either reinforce or challenge other social pressures.  Reinforcing environmental 
social influence occurs when the citizen was socialized by a Republican mother or father, and then resides in 
a Republican leaning environment, or vice versa for Democrats.  Conversely, challenging social pressures 
occur when the individual is socialized by Republican parents and resides in an environment consisting of 
Democratic leaning pressures.  The same holds for spousal influence.  An individual who is married to a 
Republican spouse and lives in a Republican context receives reinforcing pressures, while one is married to 
a Republican spouse and resides in a Democratic environment receives challenging influences. 
 
When environments present social pressures reinforcing the early influence exerted by the family or 
contemporary influence from the spouse, the individual is receiving consistent messages, information, and 
influence.  The attachments formed early in life are fortified.  Dissonant information is relatively uncommon, 
and even when confronted, it is easy for the individual to avoid or reject it in the presence of an abundance 
of agreeable influence. On average, the formative power of early influence wanes over the life cycle (Niemi 
and Jennings 1991).  However, when these antecedent social influences are reinforced over the life cycle by 
congruent social pressures provided by the environment, the expectation is that they will maintain influence.  
The suggestion being that the persistence of early pressures over the life cycle is dependent upon later 
environmentally supplied social influence reinforcing and sustaining the early influences.  When 
environments reinforce early influence, the persistence hypothesis should find support. 
 
However, not all citizens reside in environments that provide these fortifying influences.  Many are 
surrounded by political contexts that challenge the social influences from youth or their current spousal 
pressures.  When the predisposed citizen is confronted on a daily basis with pressures to conform, 
information, and opinions that challenge his or her early socialized beliefs, there are several possible 
outcomes.  The first of these possibilities is that parental influence will persist in the face of social cross-
pressures.  After all, for adults, many views are crystallized (Sears and Funk 1999).  Partisanship serves as a 
“perceptual screen” (Campbell et al. 1960: 133) through which the political world is viewed in fashions that 
continue to reinforce prior beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2000).  Once formed by pre-
adult social forces from the family, adult partisanship is also resistant to change because citizens are unlikely 
to be encountering the consistent and pervasive messages from many (if any) other social sources throughout 
life that they encountered in the home during their childhood.  If this perspective is correct, it suggests that 
all other forms of social influence over time are filtered through the influences provided in youth and 
adolescence. 
 
On the other hand, the possibility that these environmentally supplied cross-pressures nullify early influence 
also exists.  Cross-pressures affect partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Keele and Wolak 2006).  These 
individuals are pulled in different directions as the influences provided by one’s parents are called into 
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question on a daily basis by the distribution of opinions that surround the citizen.  A person socialized by 
Republican parents but who resides in a Democratic environment faces a challenge to these early influences 
at work and church, in the neighborhood and in the grocery store.  Views about norms and acceptable beliefs 
from youth are replaced by different value sets and perspectives.  While the early years clearly present an 
important time for beliefs to be formed, it seems quite plausible that environmentally supplied 
contemporaneous influences will come to supplant these beliefs.  The persistence of environmental pressures 
to conform over time is likely to erode the lingering adolescent influence, resulting in a newly socialized 
citizen who has been cast free of his or her parents’ influence.  Put simply, when environments challenge 
other forms of social influence, these agents of constraint lose much of their formative power.  For these 
citizens, the revisionist perspective may correctly characterize the persistence of early socialization. 
 
A similar narrative likely holds for spousal influence as reinforcing or challenging pressures can create 
harmony between social pressures, or discord.  Micro-environments (such as the home) can moderate the 
effects of macro-environments suggesting that individuals can use their spouses to insulate themselves from 
the broader environment and avoid any influence (Huckfeldt et al. 1995).  However, it may also be the case 
that these macro-environments are able to lessen the influence of spousal partisanship when they challenge 
and cross-pressure the individual.  I argue that while it seems highly unlikely that broader environments have 
the ability to nullify contemporaneous spousal influence, the influences provided by the environment may 
lessen this influence when they create cross-pressures. 
 
H2: When political environments reinforce other forms of socialized influence (parents and 
spouses), these socializing agents will have a more persisting influence over the course of 
the life cycle than when political environments challenge them. 
 
Data and Results 
 
The Youth-Parent Socialization Study which follows respondents from their senior year in high school at age 
18 in 1965, over three additional waves in 1973, 1982, and 1997 provides a unique opportunity to address 
these questions by combining measures of early parental social influence with long-term panel data including 
contextual identifiers (from the restricted data file) so that respondents can be placed in a political 
environment.  Not only is the data longitudinal, but there are a number of years between waves allowing for 
a range of socializing influences from a host of sources to be tested.  This enables early familial socialization 
to be weighed against later environmental influence that citizens encounter throughout their life.1 
 
Following a host of research in the study of political environments (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 
1944; Miller 1956; Putnam 1966; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Chinni and Gimpel 2010), I construct measures of 
the political environment at the county level.  Unfortunately, the geographic identifiers are not available for 
the 1973 wave of the survey, so the analysis focuses on 1965, 1982, and 1997.   I am able to use presidential 
election returns for the election preceding each of the survey waves (1964, 1980, 1996 elections) to construct 
a measure of how Democratic or Republican the county is.2  I subtract the Democratic presidential vote share 
1 The Youth-Parent Socialization Study is arguably the best observational data in the American context for weighing questions of 
socialization.  However, there are some shortcomings that warrant mention.  The sample is not entirely representative of the population.  
It is an overwhelmingly white sample, and those who did not complete high school were excluded.  Further, cohorts who were socialized 
to politics in the 1960s experienced an unusually salient political climate that is unlike those who were socialized a decade earlier or 
later.  Despite these sample issues, there is not a theoretical reason to suspect that these dynamics influence the relationship between 
environmental social forces and parental and spousal influences. 
 
2 Some concerns exist regarding the use of election data to build measures of context.  Most prominently, using election returns 
maximizes candidate effects (Abrams and Fiorina 2012).  While this point certainly warrants consideration, there are also reasons to 
believe that using election data is beneficial.  The goal of the measure is to capture distributions of partisans, and we know that individual 
partisanship and their votes in presidential elections correlate very highly (e.g. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).  As a result, using voting 
behavior to construct measures of the nature of social pressures one is exposed to has been commonplace in some of the most seminal 
works on social influence (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).  On a more practical note, the primary alternative would be to use voter 
registration files which are only available in a little over half of the states, and raise theoretical questions about the degree to which they 
are updated to reflect changes in macropartisanship.  Election data is able to capture swings in aggregate party affiliation that we know 
occur in response to national conditions (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989). 
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from the Republican presidential vote share in the county to measure the partisan composition of the county.3  
This creates a variable where positive values indicate a Republican leaning county political environment, and 
negative values represent a Democratic leaning county political environment.  Table 1 shows the distribution 
of this variable for all three survey waves. 
 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
There is a wide range in the variable over all three waves, with some respondents residing in very Republican 
counties (the highest values) while others reside in heavily Democratic counties (the lowest values).4 
 
As noted earlier, one of the strongest features of the Youth-Parent Socialization Study is that we also have 
measures of parental political preferences from the 1965 wave to measure the kind of early political 
socialization that the respondent received.  Both mother and father’s partisanship on the seven-point 
partisanship scale from 1965 are included in models of respondent partisanship as measures of this early 
socialization influence.  We also have measures of the respondent’s spouse’s partisanship as another measure 
of micro-social influence.  This variable is not available for the first wave of the survey, though presumably 
few respondents had a spouse during their senior year of high school.5 
A problem that does arise with this measure is a substantial amount of missing data since the 1965 wave is 
missing, and even when asked in later waves large numbers of respondents did not have a spouse.  In the 
1982 wave, 41% of the sample did not have a spouse (383 respondents), and in the 1997 wave 28% did not 
have a spouse (258 respondents).  In order to maintain a reasonable number of observations in models and 
include the spousal partisanship measure despite this missing data issue, I use the “dummy variable 
adjustment” method.6 
 
First, I show the results of three cross-sectional regressions, one for each of the survey waves in the analysis.  
These models demonstrate the ways in which various macro and micro social environments and social 
pressures influence the partisanship of the respondent at different stages in his or her life cycle.  Highlighting  
  
3 For example, if the Democratic candidate received 55% of the presidential vote in the county and the Republican received 35% of the 
vote, the county would be coded as a 20, indicating that it is a Democratic leaning environment, and by a magnitude of roughly 20 
percentage points. 
 
4 The means suggest that in 1965, most respondents were residing in fairly heavily Democratic leaning counties, in 1982 the mean 
county was Republican leaning, and in 1997 the mean county was slightly Democratic.  In general, these means comport with our 
understanding of partisan mood in the country, suggesting that they are relatively representative of the distribution of environments 
nationally. 
 
5 The Youth-Parent Socialization Study contains only ZIP code identifiers which are an inherently messy contextual unit.5  If political 
data were available at the ZIP code level dating back to the first wave in 1965 to allow for the creation of environmental measures at 
this level that would be ideal.  Unfortunately they are not, requiring ZIP codes to be converted into counties where we have the relevant 
environmental data.  ZIP codes change some over time, and ZIP codes occasionally cross meaningful boundaries such as county lines 
making them somewhat difficult to accurately place the individual into the correct county environment.  What this means is that for 
some respondents where I have the ZIP code of residence, they could actually be in one of two counties.  This likely creates some error 
in constructing the county political environment measure.  However, the extent to which the respondent is placed in the wrong county 
is quite limited.  Though some ZIP codes do cross county lines, when this occurs, it is most often very minimal.5  For the 1965 wave, 
67% of the ZIP codes were 100% within one county so there was no error, and roughly 92% of the ZIP codes were over 90% within one 
county.  This means that for 92% of the sample there was either no error in county assignment, or at worst a 1 in 10 chance. In the 1982 
wave, 75% of the ZIP codes were 100% within one county so there was no error, and roughly 93% of the ZIP codes were over 90% 
within one county.  For the 1997 wave, 74% of the ZIP codes were 100% contained in one county creating no error, and 92% were over 
90% in a single county.  When ZIP codes cross county lines, I use the primary county as the respondent’s political environment. 
 
6 This method involves assigning an arbitrary value to the missing data, I assign missing cases the value of -1, and then including a 
dummy variable in the regression that is coded 1=missing, 0=not missing on the spouse’s partisanship measure.  While this method is 
not acceptable when data are truly missing (i.e. if the respondent had a spouse but we were not measuring his or her partisanship), it is 
acceptable in cases such as this where the value truly does not exist because the respondent does not have a spouse (Allison 2001).  In 
fact, Allison uses this very issue of spousal characteristics to illustrate situations in which the dummy variable adjustment method is 
appropriate. In footnote 5 he states “For example, married respondent’s may be asked to rate the quality of their marriage, but that 
question has no meaning for unmarried respondents.  Suppose we assume that there is one linear equation for married couples and 
another equation for unmarried couples.  The married equation is identical to the unmarried equation except that it has (a) a term 
corresponding to the effect of marital quality on the dependent variable and (b) a different intercept.  It’s easy to show that the dummy 
variable adjustment method produces optimal estimates in this situation” (Allison 2001: 88). 
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the multiple sources of social influence that exist raises the potential for these sources to be in conflict or 
congruence.  The dependent variable in these models is the respondent’s partisanship on a seven point scale 
ranging from strong Democrat at the low end to strong Republican at the high end. 
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
What emerges from these cross-sectional regressions is a clear pattern of social influence dynamics over the 
life cycle.  At wave 1 in 1965 when the respondent is roughly 18 years old and presumably still living at 
home with his or her parents, the household micro-environment exerts a tremendous influence, consistent 
with our understanding of parental partisan socialization (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Niemi 
1968).  Across the full range of mother’s partisanship from the most Democratic to most Republican, we see 
a 2.25 point shift in the respondent’s partisanship in a Republican direction, and the same range of the father’s 
partisanship produces a similar but slightly larger movement of 2.49 points on the 7 point scale of 
partisanship.  Further, at this stage in life, the macro environment does not appear to be consequential.  None 
of the other variables in the model were significant.  This pattern of influence changes notably however by 
wave 2 in which the respondent is roughly 35 years old. 
 
By 35 years of age, the lasting imprint of parental socialization is still evident, but the magnitude of the effect 
has diminished.  There is a significant and positive effect of the county-level political environment on the 
partisanship of the respondent.  Those residing in more Republican environments display a more Republican 
partisanship.  The magnitude of the effect provided by these environments is not inconsequential.  Moving 
from the minimum (the most Democratic county in the sample) to the maximum (the most Republican county 
in the sample) produces a shift of 1.86 points on the 7 point partisanship scale in a Republican direction.  Put 
differently, if a respondent were to be a Democratic-leaning Independent and residing in the most Democratic 
county in the sample and were to relocate to the most Republican county we would expect his or her 
partisanship to shift roughly 2 points to becoming a Republican-leaning Independent. 
Micro-environments in the form of the household are still highly influential, but the source of micro influence 
has shifted to the spouse.  In fact, by age 35, the spouse is more influential than either parent was at age 18.  
Moving from the minimum value of spousal partisanship (a strong Democrat) to the maximum (a strong 
Republican) produces a 2.63 point shift in a Republican direction for the respondent.  The lasting effect of 
parental partisanship is still present at age 35, though the magnitude of the effects are smaller than for both 
spouses and macro environments.  Put differently, by this stage in an individual’s life, parental socialization 
still matters, but environments have become more consequential.  Looking across the range of parental 
partisanship from the most Democratic to most Republican mother produces a .68 shift in a Republican 
direction for the respondent, and the same shift for the father produces a 1.1 magnitude change for the 
respondent.   The largest change that emerges is that macro environments become influential at this later 
stage in life. 
 
A very similar pattern emerges at wave 3 when the respondent is roughly 50.  The county macro-environment 
continues to exert a strong influence on the individual of a similar magnitude to the one that we observed in 
wave 2.  Going from the most Democratic to most Republican county results in a 1.66 point shift in a 
Republican direction on the 7 point partisanship scale.  The effect of early micro-environments from the 
family diminish further from their effects at age 35.  Mother’s partisanship is no longer a significant predictor 
of child partisanship, and father’s partisanship remains relatively constant in influence from age 35, with a 
magnitude of a 1.11 point shift across the full range of values.  Finally, the effects of spousal partisanship 
increase from age 35 to age 50, with the magnitude of the effect jumping from 2.63 at age 35 to 3.47 at age 
50.  Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the socialization effect sizes across all three waves demonstrating the 
dynamics of social influence across the life cycle. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
 
This suggests that while social environments clearly are consequential in shaping partisanship, the sources 
of social influence are not static across the life-cycle.  Micro-environments in the form of household 
influences (whether they are parental or spousal) always matter, but macro-environments matter after the 
teen years and their effects, though smaller than those of the micro-environment, are still sizeable.  The 
consistent effect of micro-environments is potentially due to the intimacy of the ties between people and their 
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parents or spouses as argued by the social cohesion perspective.  However, the fact that we see correlations 
emerge for individuals and their political surroundings after they have left the home suggests that less 
intimate sources do exert pressures to conform.  Social influence matters from both immediate and more 
distant sources, and is not a process that is complete following the early parental effects.  In fact, by the time 
the individual is 50, the lasting imprint of these early formative years has diminished dramatically and is 
dwarfed by the contemporaneous influence of the spouse and macro-environment.  Though early parental 
social pressures do have a lasting legacy, the social pressures supplied by the environment are actually more 
consequential by the time the individual is 35. 
 
These patterns and multiple sources of socializing influence point to the potential for competing social 
pressure.  What happens when the contemporaneous environment supports the early social influence passed 
on from parents, and what happens when it challenges it?  Do the early social influences that have dominated 
our understanding of partisan formation persist, or do environments throughout life have the ability to either 
reinforce or negate and replace early predispositions? 
 
To explore this question, I create a measure of whether the contemporaneous environment either reinforces 
or challenges the early social influence provided by the mother and father, as well as the extent to which 
these environments reinforce or challenge contemporaneous spousal influence.  This dichotomous variable 
is coded 1 if the contemporaneous environment is Republican in nature, and the influence from the 
socialization agent was Democratic or if the contemporaneous environment is Democratic in nature and the 
influence from the socialization agent is Republican.  This creates a measure of environmentally supplied 
social cross-pressures.  Those who are not cross pressured, the individual who resides in a Republican 
environment and was received early Republican social influence, and the individual who resides in a 
Democratic environment and received early Democratic social influence are coded 0.  This variable is 
interacted with the direct effect of early parental social influence, as well as contemporaneous spousal 
influence, to determine the moderating effect that environmentally supplied cross-pressures have on these 
direct effects. 
 
Table 3 shows the moderating effect of these cross-pressures in the interaction term between parental and 
spousal partisanship and the environmentally supplied cross-pressures measure.  Figure 3 shows the marginal 
effect of parental and spousal influence when the environment reinforces the parental and spousal influence 
(no cross-pressures), and then the environment challenges these influences (environmentally supplied cross-
pressures exist).  The results strongly support the hypothesis that broader environments do not simply serve 
as a source of direct social influence as was demonstrated previously, but that these environments have the 
potential to create cross-pressures which serve to negate the effects of early parental socialization, and reduce 
the powerful effect of contemporaneous spousal influence. 
 
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 About Here] 
 
We see no significant moderating effect of environmental cross-pressures at age 18 for either mother or 
father’s partisanship.  This is not surprising since there was no direct effect of the environment at these early 
stages in the previous models that were discussed.  However, at both 35 and 50, there is a significant 
moderating effect.  In both of these waves, when the environment that the individual resides in challenges 
the social influences supplied by the mother and father early in life creating environmentally supplied cross-
pressures, there is no effect of the early socialization processes. 
 
Conversely, when the environment supplies reinforcing socializing pressure, there is a lasting effect across 
the duration of the panel for both mother and father’s influence.  Recall from Table 3 that the effect of the 
mother’s partisanship waned significantly over the panel to the point where it was not a significant predictor 
of partisanship at 50, but we see here that when the environment reinforces the early influences there is a 
significant effect of mother’s partisanship across the duration of the panel. 
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A similar pattern emerges for the effect of contemporaneous spousal influences.  When the environment 
challenges the spouse’s partisanship creating social cross-pressures, the spousal effect is significantly lower 
than when the environment reinforces it.  However, in the case of spousal partisanship, even though the effect 
is lessened by the challenging environment, there is still a significant effect remaining.  Environments can 
mitigate, but not eliminate contemporaneous spousal influence. 
 
The cross-sectional regressions are instructive for seeing how sources and magnitudes of influence change 
over the lifecycle, and help to establish the ways in which environmental influence becomes more prevalent 
over time.  However, they do not allow for inferences to be drawn about which sources of influence matter 
the most over the life cycles, or for the contributions of different sources of influences over time to be weighed 
against one another.  I turn to a random-intercept panel model which utilizes all three waves of the survey to 
address these questions. 
 
These effects show a distinct pattern of how colliding social influences affect the citizen over the life cycle, 
but leave unclear what the collective effects are over the course of the life cycle.  I estimate three random-
effects panel models to assess how these conflicting social pressures influence the citizen over the course of 
the life cycle.  The first two models are focused on the effects of cross-pressures between the environment 
and parental social influence, and the third is focused on environmental and spousal cross-pressures.  In a 
similar fashion to the panel models presented earlier, I exclude spousal partisanship and education from the 
first two models as they are missing for the 1965 wave and keeping them in the model would drop this year.  
Table 4 presents these results and Figure 3 show the marginal effects of each form of social influence when 
the environment either supports and reinforces the influence, or challenges it creating cross-pressures. 
 
[Table 4 and Figure 3 Here] 
 
When environments challenge the father’s partisanship, we see that the marginal effect of the father’s 
partisanship is lessened, though the two effects are not statistically different from one another at the 95% 
confidence level.  For the mother’s and spouse’s partisanship however, the marginal effect of the influence 
is significantly lower when environmentally supplied cross-pressures are present than when they are not.  
Over the course of the life cycle, these reinforcing and conflicting influences appear to be quite formative.  
When reinforced, early socialized influences persists, likely producing the stable partisan that much research 
has noted.  However, when challenged, it appears that the partisan is cut loose of his or her predispositions, 
potentially becoming an unstable or unreliable partisan. 
 
In sum, I have shown consistent evidence regarding the nature of social pressures and influence that extend 
beyond an individual’s formative years, and how these varying influences either compete with or reinforce 
one another.  Specifically, I have focused on how the political environments that citizens reside in shape their 
partisanship over the life cycle providing direct influence, as well as interacting with other social pressures 
either reinforcing or nullifying those effects.  The results demonstrate that over the life cycle, the lasting 
imprint of parental socialization ebb while the effects of the broader political environment increase once the 
citizen leaves the home.  Not only do these environments become more important than early parental 
socialization over the life cycle, but they also interact with both parental and spousal social pressures.  When 
environments reinforce these influences, we see a significant and enduring effect of parental and spousal 
partisanship on the individual across the lifecycle.  However, when environments challenge the influences 
supplied by parents and spouse’s creating cross-pressures we see that these other forces are weakened (in the 
case of spousal socialization) or eliminated (in the case of parental socialization).  Environments emerge as 
an important source of direct social influence, as well as a force that moderates the effectiveness of other 
social processes. 
 
One of the largest concerns and criticisms of work on social influence is that when we observe correlations 
they may be a product of selection rather than influence.  In the case of the results presented here, these are 
valid concerns.  It may be the case that people are selecting spouses and places to live as a result of their prior 
attitudes or prior social influences.  Appendix A explores these possibilities in depth with a series of models 
testing spousal and environmental selection in a number of ways.  The results are mixed with respect to 
spousal selection.  There is not strong evidence that the respondents in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study 
are selecting spouses based upon the main respondent’s prior party identification.  There is suggestive but 
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far from robust evidence that strength of partisanship in youth influences the individual’s propensity to marry 
a spouse whose party identification is different from the individual’s in youth and is different from that of 
his or father.  There is no evidence that pattern exists for spousal partisanship that challenges the mother’s 
party affiliation.  Finally, there is no evidence that the respondents are selecting (or ‘sorting’) into reinforcing 
political environments, nor that those who move to places which challenge their parent’s partisanship are 
more malleable than those who do not. The main conclusions are that there is some caution warranted in 
interpreting the spousal effects that I have shown, but no evidence that similar skepticism is warranted for 
the interactions with county partisan context.  See Appendix A for a thorough discussion and testing of 
selection effects. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The environments that surround individuals on a day to day basis appear to be a powerful source of social 
influence.  Over the course of the life-cycle, these environments exert just as much pressure on the 
individual’s partisanship as does early familial socialization which has received much of the attention for 
shaping party identification.  Once the individual leaves the home following adolescence, we do see a 
persisting legacy of early influence, but contemporaneous environments actually exert a more significant 
effect on partisanship.  Two suggestions follow: First, socialization is a lifelong process whereby partisanship 
is continuously updated and shaped by the distribution of opinions and influences around the individual. 
Second, the sources of social influence shift over time from parents and family, to environments and spouses. 
 
Beyond the direct socializing effects that environments have, people’s surroundings moderate the effects of 
other forms of social influence, including those from the family.  Social influence is layered. Considering the 
effects of various socializing agents in isolation misses much of the story regarding how these various 
influences interact over time, producing a socialized partisan, or not.  There is no doubt that early processes 
have the potential to endure over time, but whether they actually do so or not, appears to be largely dependent 
upon whether the environments that people encounter throughout the lifespan reinforce these early 
influences. 
 
This point speaks to a debate within the socialization literature over the extent which socialization produces 
stasis or can foster dynamics.  I find support for both, with contemporaneous socializing influences from the 
political environment moderating which explanation holds.  When socialized reinforcement occurs, parental 
influence persists over the course of the panel, supporting the persistence model.  However, when 
environments challenge early influence, parental pressures are negated once the citizen has left the home, 
presumably opening the door for other influence and instability, supporting the revisionist model.  To 
understand the effects of early socialization, we need to understand the effects of contemporaneous 
socialization. 
 
What makes environments unique and important as a form of social influence is that they typically vary 
significantly within individuals over time.  Other forms of social influence, primarily parental social pressure, 
suggest stasis as the individual is set on a trajectory early in life that is rarely to be deviated from.  
Environments on the other hand vary dramatically across both space and time, and suggest a more malleable 
picture of the partisan citizen where socialization can foster change rather than stability.  The evidence 
presented here points to a picture of social influence fostering changing political preferences.  The suggestion 
is that socialization should be thought of a continuous process throughout life, and one that involves the 
interaction of multiple sources of influence. 
 
The other insight that follows pertains to the two prominent theories of social influence – social cohesion and 
structural equivalence.  The early socialization literature, couched in the social cohesion argument that 
intimate ties transmit social influence clearly holds weight here.  We observe the lasting legacy of early 
familial socialization over much of the lifecycle, as has been noted by many.  However, the rising influence 
of political environments as individuals age and leave the household also provides strong support for the 
structural equivalence argument that those who hold similar structural positions exert the most influence.  I 
have shown here that when these two theories collide, structurally derived influence can mitigate early  
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influence from intimate sources.  Put differently, understanding the extent to which cohesion and equivalence 
shape citizen preferences depends in part upon the extent to which these independent sources of pressure 
either reinforce or challenge one another. 
 
 
Appendix A (To be made available online): Selection into Marriage and Environment 
 
Social forces are rarely exogenous.  In many circumstances, individuals have the ability to select into social 
contexts, and much research suggests that the dominant tendency is one of ‘homophily’ where people prefer 
to surround themselves with social pressures that are congruent or reinforcing of their priors.  That is, people 
may be selecting their spouses based on similar partisanship, and may be selecting places to live when they 
move that have congruent distributions of partisans (e.g. Bishop 2008).  This presents a notable threat to 
inference when studying the effects of social pressure, as correlations between these measures and individual 
attitudes could be a product of selection rather than influence.  To explore this possibility, I look at whether 
such selection appears to be taking place in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study. 
 
I begin with the question of whether or not individuals are more likely to have a spouse with similar 
partisanship.  While it is impossible to fully test spousal selection with this data, we can look to see how 
wave 1 party identification (unmarried) predicts wave 2 spousal partisanship for those who marry.  To do 
this, I use the individual’s party identification in the 1965 wave when the respondents are unmarried (with 
the exception of 7 individuals who are married at the time of this survey wave) to predict the party 
identification of their spouses in the 1973 wave when 74% of the sample has become married.  This is not a 
perfect way to assess partisan spousal selection as there could be influence on the spouse’s partisanship by 
the main respondent that is being captured by the 1973 measure of spousal party identification and thus is 
not a perfect reflection of selection.  First, I show the results of a simple bivariate regression modeling the 
effects of individual partisanship at wave 1 on spousal partisanship at wave 2 in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Appendix Table 1: Effect of 1965 Party Identification on 1973 Spousal Party Identification   
 
Party Identification, 1965      .131* 
        (.040) 
Constant       2.36* 
        (.126) 
 
N        508 
R-Squared       .02     
Notes: p*<.05. Sample restricted to those who are married during 1973 wave. 
 
We see that there is a positive and significant effect of individual partisanship at wave 1 on the party 
identification of their spouses at wave 2.  While there are likely a number factors at play which explain this, 
it is consistent with what we would expect to see if people select spouses with similar affiliations to their 
own.  The magnitude of this effect is not overwhelming however, across the full range of individual party 
identification we would expect a .79 shift in spousal partisanship on a 7-point scale. 
 
While this model is suggestive, it does not control for the other factors that could be influencing the 
partisanship of the person whom the main respondent marries.  I consider this in Appendix Table 2.  Here, I 
control for race, expecting that Whites will have spouses who are more Republican, gender expecting that 
males will have spouses with more Democratic partisanship, the Republican context measure from 1965 that 
was used earlier expecting to find that individuals who were raised in Republican counties will be more likely 
to have Republican spouses, and the partisanship of the main respondent’s parents as people may select mates 
who resemble their families. 
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Appendix Table 2: Effect of 1965 Party Identification on 1973 Spousal Party Identification   
 
Party Identification, 1965      .061 
        (.071) 
Race (White=1)       1.20* 
        (.368) 
Gender (Male=1)       .029 
        (.182) 
Republican Context, 1965      .011* 
        (.004) 
Mother’s Partisanship, 1965     .055 
        (.062) 
Father’s Partisanship, 1965     .020 
        (.062) 
Constant       1.50* 
        (.360) 
 
N        369 
R-Squared       .08     
Notes: p*<.05 
 
We see that in this model, several significant predictors of spousal partisanship emerge, but the individual’s 
identification in 1965 is not one of them.  Rather, race and the partisan context in 1965 become the significant 
variables explaining the party identification of the main respondent’s spouse.  Whites had more Republican 
spouses than non-Whites, and those who were raised in more Republican counties had more Republican 
spouses.  Accounting for a range of other factors, one’s partisanship at 18 does not appear to be a significant 
predictor of the partisanship of his or her spouse eight years later. 
 
What does this mean about threats to inference pertaining to spousal partisanship?  We have seen that there 
does not appear to be a strong effect of wave 1 partisanship on wave 2 spousal partisanship for those who 
marry over this span.  This suggests that selection of like-minded spouses – while certainly not out of the 
question – appears to be somewhat limited in this data.  What remains a possibility is that the kinds of people 
who are willing to marry spouses of the other party are fundamentally different than those who are not.  If 
these differences could influence their propensity to alter partisanship later in life, then this would represent 
a threat to inference for the findings presented.  If weak partisans are more likely to marry an out-party 
spouse, then this could be the case.  Also, if those whose parents provide conflicting partisan pressures are 
more likely to marry an out-party spouse, then we might expect these individuals to be more subject to later 
pressures. 
 
Appendix Table 3 models a binary dependent variable where 1 represents those who were a Republican in 
the 1965 wave and are married to a Democrat in the 1973 wave, or vice versa, and a 0 represents those who 
were Democrats in the 1965 wave and married a Democrat, or vice versa.  Of particular interest is whether 
those who marry an out-party spouse are more prone to changing partisanship.  To explore this, I model 
whether strength of partisanship in 1965 and parental partisan conflict predict one’s propensity to marry 
across party lines (between 1965 and 1973). 
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Appendix Table 3: Explanations of Who Marries a Spouse with Opposing Partisanship    
 
Strength of Partisanship, 1965     -.249+ 
        (.134) 
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965     -.055 
        (.073) 
Constant       .337 
        (.293) 
 
N        418 
R-Squared       .01     
Notes: p+<.1. Logit coefficients are shown.  
 
A suggestive effect emerges.  Stronger partisans in 1965 were less likely to be observed with a spouse in 
1973 whose partisanship conflicts with the main respondent’s party identification in 1965.  This effect is 
significant at the p<.1 level.  What this means is that those who are more malleable early in life (weak 
partisans) are more likely to marry a spouse who is of the opposing party.  This could potentially be 
magnifying spousal effects throughout the panel.  The effect of having conflicting parental partisanship which 
could also result in more malleability is insignificant. 
 
It is also possible that there is something unique about those who marry a spouse with partisanship that 
conflicts with the party identification of one’s parents.  If those with weak early attachments are more likely 
to marry someone who has a party affiliation that conflicts with the partisanship of one’s parents, we could 
observe larger effects of spousal partisanship displacing parental socialization, not because of spousal 
influence but because of selection.  Appendix Tables 4 and 5 explore this possibility. 
 
Appendix Table 4: Explanations of Conflict Between Spousal and Father’s Partisanship    
 
Strength of Partisanship, 1965     -.259* 
        (.106) 
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965     .036 
        (.068) 
Constant       .202 
        (.225) 
 
N        447 
R-Squared       .01     
Notes: p*<.05. Logit coefficients are shown.  
 
 
Appendix Table 5: Explanations of Conflict Between Spousal and Mother’s Partisanship    
 
Strength of Partisanship, 1965     -.169 
        (.107) 
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965     .026 
        (.068) 
Constant       .025 
        (.228) 
 
N        441 
R-Squared       .00     
Notes: p*<.05. Logit coefficients are shown.  
 
We see that there is a negative and significant effect of strength of partisanship on the likelihood of marrying 
a spouse who has a different party affiliation than the respondent’s father.  Those with weaker party affiliation 
in 1965 were more likely to marry a spouse with partisanship that was different from his or her father’s than 
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those with stronger partisanship.  If weaker partisans early in life are more susceptible to influence later in 
life, then this selection could explain part of the moderating effect that we observe, rather than spousal 
influence.  However, we do not see this effect emerge for mother’s partisanship, nor is there evidence in 
either table to suggest that conflicting parental partisanship influences the party affiliation of the respondent’s 
spouse. 
 
Thus, there is some reason to suspect that the results presented pertaining to spousal influence are in part of 
product of selection and not influence.  This is not entirely surprising, and common when dealing with social 
phenomenon.  However, there is also reason to be less concerned.  I do not find compelling evidence that 
spouses are chosen for their partisan congruence with the individual, and the evidence that those who select 
spouses which are congruent with their early partisanship and with that of their parents is spotty.  The only 
finding which is significant at the 95% confidence level is that weak partisans are more likely to select a 
spouse whose partisanship challenges that of their fathers than are strong partisans.  In sum, caution is 
warranted with the moderating results of spousal partisanship that are presented in the paper, but there is no 
evidence of pervasive selection effects that should draw heavy skepticism. 
 
Turning to whether selection into reinforcing environments appears to be taking place, the evidence suggests 
that this is not a primary concern in this survey.  First, I look at simple crosstabs of those who moved between 
the 1973-1982 survey waves, and those who moved between the 1982-1997 survey waves.  If selection into 
congruent environments is a concern, we should observe that when people move, they are more likely to end 
up in a county that is of their same partisanship than a county that is of opposing partisanship.  The first table 
shows the number of Democrats and Republicans in 1973 who moved to Democratic and Republican counties 
between the 1973 and 1982 waves.  The observations are limited to those who moved out of their states 
between waves.  No clear pattern that would suggest a partisan sorting process is evident.  The main factor 
that we observe is more people of both parties moving to Republican counties.  This is likely in part a function 
of macropartisanship trends making more Republican counties across the nation in 1982.  Regardless of this 
trend, there does not appear to be a clear bias suggesting partisan sorting into counties is taking place. 
 
Appendix Table 6: Where Partisans in 1973 Moved        
     Democratic  Republican 
     County, 1982  County, 1982    
Democrat, 1973    28   83 
Republican, 1973    9   50     
Notes:  Table shows the number of individuals who moved out of state between 1973-1982, and what kind 
of county we observe them in during the 1982 wave. 
 
This conclusion is reinforced by looking at the moves which took place between the 1982-1997 waves.  Here 
we observe that of the Democrats who made substantial moves between survey waves, more of them moved 
to Republican counties than Democratic counties.  While slightly more Republicans moved to Republican 
counties than Democratic counties, the difference is hardly large enough to suggest a sorting process. 
 
Appendix Table 7: Where Partisans in 1982 Moved        
     Democratic  Republican 
     County, 1997  County, 1997    
Democrat, 1982    36   38 
Republican, 1982    30   35     
Notes:  Table shows the number of individuals who moved out of state between 1982-1997, and what kind 
of county we observe them in during the 1997 wave. 
 
While the crosstabs do not offer a picture consistent with the geographic sorting argument, there are some 
small differences that emerge.  To test whether these small differences are statistically significant, I run 
simple bivariate logit models where the dependent variable whether the individual resides in a Republican or 
Democratic county at wave 2, and the independent variable is party identification at wave 1.  The sample is 
restricted to only those who moved out of state. 
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Appendix Table 8: Effect of Party Identification in 1973 on Partisan County in 1982    
 
Party Identification, 1973      .086 
        (.101) 
Constant       1.11* 
        (.291) 
 
Pseudo R-Square       .00 
N        209     
Notes:  Logit coefficients shown.  Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1973 and 
1982. 
 
 
Appendix Table 9: Effect of Party Identification in 1982 on Partisan County in 1997    
 
Party Identification, 1982      .059 
        (.089) 
Constant       -.025 
        (.308) 
 
Pseudo R-Square       .00 
N        151     
Notes:  Logit coefficients shown.  Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 1982 and 
1997. 
 
In Tables 8 and 9 we see that the effect of wave 1 party identification on wave 2 partisan county environment 
is insignificant across both the 1973-1982 and 1982-1997 waves.  It appears from both the crosstabs and the 
logit models that partisan selection into congruent environments does not appear to be a substantial concern 
in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study. 
 
The final question that is raised is whether those who move and find themselves in a context which challenges 
the partisanship of their parents are different from those who do not.  Specifically, we want to know whether 
they are more likely to be influenced or have their partisanship altered.  Similar with the models shown 
exploring spousal partisanship, I use strength of partisanship from the prior survey wave as well as whether 
there was partisan conflict between parents in wave as measures of how susceptible to change the individual 
is.  If those who find themselves in contexts which challenge parental partisanship are different on these 
dimensions (i.e. weaker partisans or had parental partisan conflict) then we may be concerned that the 
interactions shown in paper between environment and early parental partisanship are capturing selection and 
not influence. 
 
In the models that follow, I use a binary dependent variable where 1 is when conflict exists between the social 
pressures supplied by the environment and those from the parent early in life (Democratic county and 
Republican parents or Republican county and Democratic parents), and a 0 when they are supplying 
congruent pressures (Democratic county and Democratic parents or Republican county and Republican 
parents).  I run a total of four models.  One model for this conflict between environment and father’s 
partisanship and one model for mother’s.  I run them with dependent variables from both 1982 and 1997.  
Because we are interested in whether selection into these environments is producing differences, the models 
are run on those who moved between waves. 
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Appendix Table 10: Explanations of County that Challenges Father’s Party ID, 1982    
 
Strength of Partisanship, 1973     .352* 
        (.174) 
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965     .125 
        (.109) 
Constant       -.677* 
        (.332) 
 
N        161 
Pseudo R-Squared      .03     
Notes: p*<.05. Logit coefficients are shown.  Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 
1973-1982. 
 
 
Appendix Table 11: Explanations of County that Challenges Mother’s Party ID, 1982    
 
Strength of Partisanship, 1973     .409* 
        (.175) 
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965     -.147 
        (.110) 
Constant       -.666* 
        (.334) 
 
N        162 
R-Squared       .03     
Notes: p*<.05.  Logit coefficients are shown.  Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 
1973-1982.  
 
Appendix Tables 10 and 11 show the effects of these models for conflict between the environment in 1982 
and parental partisanship in 1965.  We see that strength of partisanship is positive and significant in both 
models.  However, this means that those who found themselves cross-pressures by county environments and 
early parental partisanship were more likely to have been strong partisans in the prior wave.  That means that 
it should be harder to find effects of environmental influence rather than easier, as it is stronger partisans 
from 1973 who are in these situations following a move in 1982.  Thus, fears that it is more malleable 
individuals who are finding themselves in these cross-pressured situations, thus magnifying effects, appear 
to be the opposite of what is occurring. 
 
Next, I turn to the models from the 1997 wave in Appendix Tables 12 and 13. 
 
Appendix Table 12: Explanations of County that Challenges Father’s Party ID, 1997    
 
Strength of Partisanship, 1982     -.176 
        (.233) 
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965     .106 
        (.136) 
Constant       .439 
        (.439) 
 
N        117 
Pseudo R-Squared      .01     
Notes: p*<.05.  Logit coefficients are shown.  Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 
1982-1997. 
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Appendix Table 13: Explanations of County that Challenges Mother’s Party ID, 1997    
 
Strength of Partisanship, 1982     -.122 
        (.235) 
Parental Partisan Conflict, 1965     -.083 
        (.133) 
Constant       .468 
        (.453) 
 
N        115 
R-Squared       .00     
Notes: p*<.05.  Logit coefficients are shown.  Sample restricted to those who moved out of state between 
1982-1997.  
 
Here we see no effect of either strength of partisanship or parental partisan conflict.  It appears that there is 
no selection into cross-pressured environments on either of the measures capturing how open to influence we 
expect the respondent to be. 
 
As a result of the findings presented here pertaining to selection into environments, we can be more confident 
that the effects we observe of county environments moderating the influence of parental social influence are 
a function of influence rather than selection.  Certainly, this is not an exhaustive list of all of the kinds of 
selection that could occur, but they do provide extensive evidence across a range of years and some of the 
more troubling kinds of selection that could be occurring. 
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Tables: 
 
Table 1: County Republican Context Variable for 1965, 1982, and 1997     
  Minimum Maximum Mean  Std. Dev. N   
 
1965  -90.2  70  -22.27  21.48  842 
1982  -61.5  72.7  9.88  19.51  891 
1997  -75.9  52.4  -5.68  20.58  898 
             
 
 
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Effects of Socializing Influences on Direction of Partisanship    
      1965  1982  1997   
 
Republican Context    .001  .014*  .013* 
      (.002)  (.003)  (.003) 
Mother’s Partisanship (1965)   .321*  .097*  .015 
      (.035)  (.039)  (.040) 
Father’s Partisanship (1965)   .355*  .157*  .160* 
      (.033)  (.038)  (.039) 
Spouse’s Partisanship     -------  .376*  .496* 
        (.036)  (.032) 
Education     -------  -.033  -.078 
        (.049)  (.049) 
Race (White=1)     .026  .906*  1.01* 
      (.198)  (.232)  (.239) 
Gender (Male=1)     .141  .338*  .661* 
      (.103)  (.115)  (.119) 
Unmarried     -------  1.27*  -1.49* 
        (.174)  (.190) 
Constant     .714*  .174  .146* 
      (.193)  (.246)  (.255) 
 
N      659  685  704 
R-Square     .55  .35  .42   
Notes: p*<.05, two-tailed test. 
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Table 3: Moderating Effects of Challenging Environments on Familial and Spousal Social Influence        
                     Father’s Influence                Mother’s Influence           Spousal Influence 
       1965 1982 1997  1965 1982 1997  1982 1997   
 
Father’s Partisanship     .313* .235* .240*  .351* .172* .153*  .174* .144* 
       (.046) (.047) (.047)  (.034) (.039) (.040)  (.039) (.041) 
Mother’s Partisanship     .327* .110* .026  .294* .178* .126*  .110* .051 
       (.035) (.040) (.041)  (.049) (.048) (.049)  (.041) (.042) 
Spouse’s Partisanship     ------- .373* .503*  ------- .362* .494*  .447* .574* 
        (.036) (.033)   (.036) (.033)  (.041) (.039) 
Environment Challenges Father’s Influence   .056 .287 .388*  ------- ------- -------  ------- ------- 
       (.057) (.184) (.176) 
Environment Challenges Mother’s Influence   ------- ------- -------  -.217 .333+ .471*  ------- ------- 
           (.224) (.194) (.186) 
Environment Challenges Spouse’s Influence   ------- ------- -------  ------- ------- -------  .295* .525* 
               (.146) (.152) 
Father’s PID X Environment Challenges   -.114 -.166* -.163*  ------- ------- -------  ------- ------- 
       (.223) (.058) (.051) 
Mother’s PID X Environment Challenges   ------- ------- -------  .066 -.176* -.190*  ------- ------- 
           (.058) (.060) (.053) 
Spouse’s PID X Environment Challenges   ------- ------- -------  ------- ------- -------  -.208* -.158* 
               (.058) (.046) 
Race (White=1)      -.061 .951* 1.06*  -.066 .985* 1.09*  .974* 1.08* 
       (.207) (.239) (.244)  (.202) (.238) (.242)  (.239) (.247) 
Male       .174+ .266* 1.06*  .177+ .268* .712*  .301* .731* 
       (.103) (.118) (.122)  (.103) (.119) (.123)  (.120) (.124) 
Education      ------- -.077 -.140*  ------- -.056 -.116*  -.070 -.117* 
        (.050) (.050)   (.050) (.050)  (.051) (.051) 
Unmarried      ------- 1.28* -1.55*  ------- 1.26* -1.50*  1.14* -1.54* 
        (.176) (.194)   (.178) (.194)  (.183) (.191) 
Constant      .772* .150 -.090  .777* .060 -.188  .102 -.257 
       (.201) (.271) (.260)  (.197) (.273) (.259)  (.267) (.266) 
 
N       697 683 692  689 674 684  659 678 
R-Squared      .55 .34 .40  .55 .34 .40  .36 .42   
Notes: *p<.05, +p<.1,  two tailed test
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Table 4: Effects of Environmental Socializing Influences Over the Full Panel, 1965-1997    
 
Father’s Partisanship (1965)    .294*  .242*  .185* 
       (.034)  (.030)  (.036) 
Mother’s Partisanship (1965)    .171*  .233*  .073+  
       (.031)  (.036)  (.037) 
Spouse’s Partisanship     -------  -------  .328* 
           (.024) 
Environment Challenges Father’s Influence   .580*  ------  ------- 
       (.117)   
Environment Challenges Mother’s Influence   -------  .673*  ------- 
         (.122) 
Environment Challenges Spouse’s Influence   -------  -------  .444* 
           (.104) 
Father’s PID X Environment Challenges   -.108*  -------  ------- 
       (.034) 
Mother’s PID X Environment Challenges   -------  -.134*  ------- 
         (.035) 
Spouse’s PID X Environment Challenges   -------  -------  -.156* 
           (.035) 
Political Knowledge     -.050  -.048  -.082* 
       (.030)  (.030)  (.037) 
Race (White=1)      .966*  .957*  1.18* 
       (.183)  (.181)  (.217) 
Gender (Male=1)      .315*  .341*  .508* 
       (.094)  (.094)  (.111) 
 
1982       .186*  .159+  ------- 
       (.094)  (.094) 
1997       .343*  .340*  .056 
       (.083)  (.084)  (.079) 
 
Constant      .463*  .411*  .545* 
       (.209)  (.207)  (.255) 
 
Number of Observations     1,954  1,932  1.216 
Number of Groups     702  694  707 
Wald Chi-Square      575.72  592.58  480.40 
 
R-Square Within      .05  .05  .07 
R-Square Between     .43  .44  .40 
R-Square Overall      .29  .30  .35  
Notes: *p<.05, +p<.1 
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